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1.  Introduction 
 
Despite the wide diffusion of innovation subsidies, there is still little consensus 
regarding  their  true  effectiveness  in  spurring  innovation;  indeed,  while  theoretical 
arguments can be invoked to support the possibility of both a positive and a negative 
impact  of  government  intervention  on  firms’  innovative  activity  (Garcia-Quevedo, 
2004), empirical studies do not clearly discriminate between them (Capron and Van 
Pottelsberghe,  1997).  Moreover,  political  interests  seem  to  have  driven  the  analysis 
mainly  towards  the  issue  of  additionality  -  i.e.  assessing  whether  an  R&D  subsidy 
involves  additional  R&D  expenditures  by  the  receiving  firm
    -  neglecting  both  the 
importance of the allocation process and the possibility that such input-side additionality 
does not translate into proportionally higher innovative outputs. 
This work tries to move one step further, combining the two (input and output) 
dimensions of innovation in a unique efficiency perspective: to this end, the impact of 
public  funding  on  the  ratio  between  total  innovative  sales  and  total  innovative 
expenditures, considered as a measure of innovative productivity, is investigated. This 
change of perspective is a response to the need for evaluation of whether supported 
firms are really doing better, not just more,  than non-supported ones, ‘doing better’ 
having  more  to  do  with  the  efficient  use  of  innovative  inputs  rather  than  with  the 
absolute value of the innovative expenditures.   
The definition of this productivity variable, together with the description of data 
and indicators used in the empirical analysis, can be found in Section 3; in Section 4 a 
bivariate-switching model is developed, the main novelty of which consists in getting rid 
of both selection bias and endogeneity of the treatment (subsidy) variable, while at the 
same time checking for possible simultaneity.  Econometric results are presented and 




2.  Previous literature 
 
Although in absolute terms public funding appears to foster  both the input and 
the output sides of innovation, a crowding out effect also seems to operate, totally or 
partially displacing privately-funded innovation activities. For instance, using a dataset 
of  firms  which  benefited  from  the  Small  Business  Innovation  Research  Program, 
Wallsten (2000) comes to the conclusion that R&D grants completely crowd out firm-
financed R&D spending, dollar for dollar.  
Much  more  optimistic  is  the  view  of  Gonzales  et  al.  (2005),  who  found  no 
evidence  of  crowding  out:  using  an  unbalanced  panel  of  more  than  2,000  Spanish 
manufacturing  firms,  the  authors  show  government  intervention  as  stimulating  R&D 
activities.  
Midway  between  such  extreme  results,  the  majority  of  existing  empirical 
literature on the subject shows that public support is indeed fostering innovation, with 
crowding out effects operating only partially (see Busom, 2000). In particular, previous 
studies  (see  Capron  and  Van  Pottelsberghe,  1997)  show  that  the  magnitude  of  the 
649Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 648-661
 
 
crowding out depends on factors such as: 1) the level of aggregation of the analysis (a 
positive effect of public support is seen much more clearly at the industry than at the 
firm level); 2) the adopted econometric methodology; 3) the size of the investigated 
firms
1 and 4) the geographical area considered. 
Most of these studies, however, do not depart from the standard additionality 
issue: does public support really add to what the subsidised firm would have invested 
had it not taken part in a policy program? What this literature seems to neglect is the 
final  impact  of  government  intervention  on  firms’  innovative  performance:  does  the 
(possibly) higher input level induced by public support lead to a correspondingly higher 
innovative performance in terms of input-output efficiency? Czarnitzki (2002) rightly 
raises this question, without fully addressing it.  
Bérubé  and  Mohnen  (2009)  deal  with  it  partially,  exploring  the  impact  that 
government intervention has on alternative measures of innovative output. However, the 
input dimension is not taken into account, thus making it impossible to figure out which 
fraction of the innovative output increase is due merely to an indirect effect of higher 
innovative inputs induced by public support, and which part, instead, reflects a direct 
impact of government intervention on firms’ innovative productivity.  
An  interesting  step  in  this  direction  has  been  taken  by  Garcia  and  Mohnen 
(2010):  using  cross-sectional  firm-level  data  taken  from  the  third  Austrian  CIS,  the 
authors show how no (significant) direct effect of government intervention on the share 
of  innovative  turnover  emerges  once  the  indirect  effect  of  a  higher  level  of  R&D 
expenditures has been accounted for
2. However, while allowing for a different intercept 
to  characterize  the  supported  and  non-supported  sub-samples,  the  authors  do  not 
explicitly investigate the possibility that public funding also affects the marginal effect 




3.  Dataset, sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
Empirical analysis investigating the impact government intervention may have 
on innovative productivity has been carried out using  firm-level data drawn from the 
third Italian Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3) conducted over a three-year period 
(1998-2000) by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). A 53% response rate 
determined the full sample size of 15,512
3 firms.  We focus on 9,034 of them, those 
belonging to the manufacturing sector. Once cleaned of outliers and firms which were 
either newborn or had recorded an output variation of at least 10% due to M&A, the 
adopted sub-sample was of 7,965 observations. The dataset comprises a set of general 
information, together with a much larger set of innovation variables.  In particular, firms 
were asked to answer the question “Has your enterprise received any kind of public 
support for innovation-related activities in the last three years?”.  
                                                 
1 Lach (2002), for example, finds that small firms enjoy positive dynamic total effects from a subsidy, 
which seem to fade away as soon as large firms are considered. 
2 See also Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998). 
3 Thanks to a weighting procedure assigning weights according to the reciprocal of the probability of each 
observation being sampled, this sample is representative, at both sector and firm size level, of the entire 
population of Italian firms with more than 10 employees. 
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We can thus introduce a public-support dummy variable (funding), equal to 1 if 
a given innovative firm received some kind of financial support to innovation, and equal 
to 0 otherwise. The filter-based nature of the CIS questionnaire requires firms to answer 
the full set of innovative questions, including the one concerning funding, only if they 
have  either  started  innovative  projects  (then  abandoned  or  still  to  be  completed)  or 
introduced innovation outputs. As a consequence, our empirical analysis is limited to 
investigating  the  efficiency  impact  of  public  funding  within  a  sample  of  innovative 
firms, while we are unable to consider its role in making a firm innovative. Therefore, 
our sample reduces to 2,855 innovative firms, generating an obvious problem of sample 
selection that we have to bear in mind when dealing with our core question: are the firms 
that received public support (funding=1) ‘doing better’ than those which did not get 
access to public funding (funding=0)?  
 In this framework, a first necessary step is that of defining an adequate measure 
of innovative performance: what do we really mean by ‘doing better’.As highlighted in 
Section 2, this paper aims to go beyond the policy evaluation literature just focusing on 
the input- or the output-side effect of funding; with this purpose in mind, the impact of 
public  funding  on  the  ratio  between  total  innovative  sales  and  total  innovative 
expenditures is explored.  From now on, this ratio will be referred to as our innovative 
productivity variable (pdtv), measuring how many €s of innovative sales (i.e. sales due 
to innovative products) a firm realizes for each € spent on innovative inputs. Adopting a 
productivity measure fully matches our aim, which is not to evaluate whether subsidized 
firms invest more in innovation, but whether they are more efficient in transforming 
innovative inputs into innovative outputs. 
One  of  the  main  limitations  of  CIS  is  that  the  only  continuous  measure  of 
innovative output is turnover due to innovative products  (turninn), which is used to 
construct our key productivity variable pdtv. This limitation further reduces the extent 
of our analysis from the 2,855 firms engaged in process and/or product innovation to the 
sub-sample of firms reporting product innovations only (746 observations)
4.  Of  these, 
389 firms (52.14%)
5 declared they had received some kind of public financial support 
(i.e.  were  ‘treated’)  during  the  previous  three  years,  while  the  remaining  357 
observations (47.86%) were not supported (‘non-treated’). 
A  preliminary,  descriptive  comparison  of  these  two  sub-samples  is  provided 
below  (Table  1),  showing  the  quantitative  (unconditional)  effect  that  the  subsidy 
produces on: 1) the share of turnover due to innovative sales (turninn(%) = sales from 
new  products/total  sales);  2)  the  total  innovative  expenditure  intensity  (tot_inn 
intensity(%)  =  total  innovative  expenditures/  total  sales);  and  3)  the  productivity 
measure we obtain upon dividing the first measure by the second (pdtv = sales due to 
new products / total innovation expenditures). 
 
 
                                                 
4 Because a continuous output measure of process innovation is not available in the adopted dataset, firms 
engaged in this form of innovation have to be excluded, otherwise the observed effect of funding on pdtv 
would be biased either downward (in the case of firms reporting process innovation only, the innovative 
productivity of which would be zero) or unpredictably downward/upward, in accordance with the effect of 
the subsidy on the qualitative composition of the innovation output (this is the case of firms declaring they 
had introduced both product and process innovations). 
5 Such a high share of supported firms in the total is explained by the selection of innovative firms only. 







Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
  Sample means  Mean differences 
  All firms 
N = 746 
Non-supported 
firms N0 = 357 
Supported firms 






Turninn (%)  26.474  23.871  28.864  4.993** 
(0.011)  + 20.91% 
tot_inn 
intensity (%) 
4.802  3.95  5.584  1.633** 
(0.002)  + 41.35% 
pdtv
6  10.938  11.86  10.09  -1.771* 
(0.081)  – 14.93% 
Notes: in the case of tot_inn intensity and pdtv, two-sample t-tests with unequal variances were computed, since 
the null of equal variances was rejected by Bartlett’s test for equal variances; p-values in brackets: *** = 1% 




Then the mean differences in the three innovation measures between supported 
and non-supported firms, the so-called ‘treatment-control comparison’, were computed. 
These differences, which provide us with preliminary estimates of the effects generated 
by  the  subsidy,  are  reported  in  the  last  two  columns  of  Table  1,  together  with  the 
corresponding p-values from the two-sample t-tests of their significance. 
However, the previous descriptive statistics do not control for the possibility that 
the negative impact of the subsidy over pdtv may be driven either by selection biases or 
by  ex  ante sources  of  firm  heterogeneity.  The  following  econometric  setting  is  thus 
devoted to testing whether the negative impact of funding on innovative productivity 
persists  once  we  have  checked  for  the  role  that  exogenous  factors  can  play  in 
differentiating the two sub-samples of supported and non-supported firms
7, as well as for 
the  two  sequential  selection  biases  affecting  our  analysis  (the  first  concerning  the 
selection of the 2,855 innovative firms from the total 7,965 surveyed, and the second 
                                                 
6 It must be noticed that:  
 







 = average of the ratios  
 
Therefore, the pdtv values shown in table 1 (third row) are not equal to the ratio between the two averages 
reported in the two rows above. 
7 See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for an exhaustive list of the observable factors introduced as controls, 
together with the other variables relevant to this study. 
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4.  The endogeneity problem: a bivariate switching solution 
 
The main difficulty affecting policy evaluation is the potential endogeneity of the 
subsidy, the assignment of which fails to satisfy the randomness property that should 
characterize pure social experiments. Indeed, an evaluation of the expected innovative 
outcome (by both the firm which has to decide whether to apply for the subsidy and the 
public agency which must decide which projects to subsidise) is likely to precede the 
allocation  process  (Lichtenberg,  1984).  This  makes  public  funding  an  endogenous 
variable with respect to innovation itself. 
The existing treatment evaluation literature offers alternative methodologies to 
deal  with  such  potential  endogeneity,  however  each  of  them  imposes  more  or  less 
restrictive  conditions
9.  In  particular,  these  approaches  rely  on  the  hypothesis  that 
depending on a set of observable explanatory factors X, the alternative outcomes  1 y  
(with the treatment) and  0 y  (without) are orthogonal to the treatment (D): 
 
 
0 1 , | y y D X ⊥                  (1) 
 
 
These  approaches  neglect  the  possibility  that  observable  factors  may 
simultaneously affect both the treatment (D) and the adopted performance measure (y). 
Simultaneous  equation  systems  accomplish  this  aim,  jointly  taking  into  account  the 
treatment  assignment  process  and  its  outcome,  i.e.  checking  whether  the  funding 
allocation process is partially determined by the same factors affecting the innovative 
process (endogeneity). In this framework, an endogenous dummy variable (D) becomes 
the dependent variable of a participation equation where the subsidy can be explained by 
the same factors affecting firms’ innovative performance (see Busom, 2000). In other 
words,  two  different  ‘regimes’  for  the  innovative  performance  are  allowed,  public 
support playing the role of endogenously switching firms from one regime to the other. 





                                                 
8 In particular, while the first source of sample selection can be dealt with through a standard Heckman 
correction (i.e. by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from a probit selection equation among the 
control variables), this is no longer the case when the second selection is considered. In fact, government 
intervention  and  the  qualitative  composition  of  the  innovative  output  can  be  seen  as  simultaneous 
decisions, this rendering the selection of firms only engaged in product innovation potentially endogenous. 
A methodological solution allowing us to deal with all these issues simultaneously is developed in Section 
4. 
9 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) for a complete overview of the 
evaluation problem. 





i i i D z u α′ = + ;    1 i D =   if  
* 0 i D > , 0 otherwise.      (2) 
1 1 1 i i i y x β ε ′ = +   i 1 ε ~ N(0,  11 σ )            (3) 
0 0 0 i i i y x β ε ′ = +   i 0 ε ~ N(0,  00 σ )          (4) 




where the set z of factors determining D partially overlaps the set x that explains the 
innovative outcome level y; the last row accounts for the likely correlation between the 
treatment-equation and the performance-equation error terms (endogeneity). 
Such a simultaneous model fulfils two needs: firstly, it allows us to correct for 
funding  endogeneity,  producing  consistent  estimates  of  the  performance  equation 
(separately  estimated  on  the  two  sub-samples  of  treated  and  non-treated  firms); 
secondly, it solves the missing-data problem affecting the treatment evaluation literature; 
indeed, although we cannot directly observe how supported firms would have behaved 
had they not received the subsidy, we can nevertheless estimate the relevant model on 
the  non-supported  firms.  The  average  treatment  effect  on  treated  firms  can  thus  be 
computed consistently as: 
 
 
[ ] [ ] 1 0 | , 1 | , 1 i i i i ATET E y x D E y x D = = − =       (5) 
 
 
where the estimated coefficients obtained using the sub-sample of non-supported firms 
are  applied  to  the  supported  ones,  in  order  to  achieve  an  estimate  of  the  potential 
productivity the supported firms would have reached had they not received the subsidy. 
This approach is here further developed in order to take into account a second 
source  of  endogeneity  arising  from  the  possible  simultaneity  between  government 
intervention  and  the  qualitative  composition  of  the  innovative  output.  Indeed,  while 
receiving a subsidy is likely to foster one innovative typology at the expense of the 
others, it appears equally plausible that the qualitative composition of the innovation a 
firm has realised may affect the probability of receiving such a subsidy. This two-way 
simultaneous relationship should be taken into account when correcting for the selection 
of product innovators only. This is why we replace the participation equation identifying 
the switching in the standard endogenous switching models (eq. 2), with a bivariate 













i a ai ai funding z u α′ = + ;  1 funding =  if 
* 0 funding > , 0 otherwise;          (6) 
  
* _ i b bi bi PDT ONLY z u α′ = + ;  _ 1 i PDT ONLY =  if 







The first system thus accounts for the “double switching” (i.e. the joint probability of 
getting  the  subsidy  and  of  engaging  in  product  innovation  only)  that  endogenously 
affects the productivity equation (second system). ε, ua and ub follow a trivariate normal 
distribution with variances σ
2, 1 and 1 respectively, and correlations ρab, ρεa and ρεb 
defined as follows: 
 
 
( , ) ab a b corr u u ρ = ;  ( , ) a a corr u ε ρ ε = ;  ( , ) b b corr u ε ρ ε = ; 
 
 
The first two selection equations can thus be correlated with each other besides 
each  being  individually  correlated  to  the  main  productivity  equation;  this  fully 
incorporates  the  correction  for  the  product-only  sample  selection  into  the  bivariate 
switching  model.  Of  course,  once  a  bivariate  (rather  than  a  univariate)  selection  is 
implemented, four instead of just two different regimes are identified, accounting for the 
potential specificities that characterize each possible combination of the two ‘switching’ 
variables: (1, 1); (0, 1); (1, 0) and (0, 0).  
From  a  computational  point  of  view,  four  productivity  equations  should  be 
estimated,  each  of  them  augmented  by  two  additional  terms  (inverse  Mills  ratios) 
correcting for the double selection bias. Thus, for instance, focusing on the sub-sample 
identified by the combination (funding=1 & PDT_ONLY=1), the estimated performance 
equation will be: 
 
 
11 i i a a b b i pdtv x β θ λ θ λ ε ′ = + + + ;             
                  
where: 
 
a a ε θ σρ = ;  b b ε θ σρ = ;  



















 ′ +  = ′ + 
 ′ + 
if funding=0 & PDT_ONLY=1 
if funding=1 & PDT_ONLY=0 
(8) 
if funding=0 & PDT_ONLY=0 
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( ) ( )
1/2 2
2 ( ) / 1 / a a b ab ab w w funding λ φ ρ ρ   = Φ − − Φ    
; 
( ) ( )
1/2 2
2 ( ) _ / 1 / b b a ab ab w w PDT ONLY λ φ ρ ρ   = Φ − − Φ    
; 
where  a a w funding α ′ = − ,  _ b b w PDT ONLY α ′ = −  and  ab ρ  all being obtained 
from the bivariate probit estimates and then used to compute  ( ) 2 , , a b ab w w ρ Φ = Φ .  
The  same  procedure  applies  to  the  other  three  sub-samples.  For  our  purposes,  the 
relevant ATET will be: 
 
 
[ ] [ ] 1 0 | , 1& _ 1 | , 1& _ 1 i i i i E pdtv x Funding PDT ONLY E pdtv x Funding PDT ONLY = = − = =  (9) 
 
where, following the same procedure adopted for the univariate endogenous switching 
model, the coefficients obtained on the sub-sample of non-supported product innovators 
will be applied to the supported ones in order to obtain an estimate of their potential 
productivity had they not received the subsidy (counterfactual).  
 
 
5.  Empirical results 
The bivariate switching model presented in Section 4 is here estimated in order 
to properly test and measure the possible negative impact of the subsidy which emerged 
from the preliminary descriptive evidence reported in Table 1. Four sequential steps 
have to be performed.  
Firstly, the sample selection of 2,855 firms out of the 7,965 surveyed firms has to 
be taken into account by a standard Heckman procedure
10, generating the inverse Mills 
ratio (lambda inn) which will be included in the following estimates.  
Secondly, the probability of receiving public support and that of being product-
only innovators were jointly estimated by means of a bivariate probit (eqs. 6 and 7). As 
can be seen in Table 2, the probability of obtaining the subsidy and of being a product-
only innovator are inversely correlated (this is not surprising, given that the majority of 
the  other  2,109  firms  are  more  committed  innovators,  performing  both  product  and 
process innovation). Of a firm’s characteristics, the availability of scientific sources of 
information,  export  orientation,  and  cooperation  with  universities  and/or  research 
institutes  all  increase  both  the  probability  of  being  a  product  innovator  and  that  of 
getting a public subsidy. Not surprisingly, the aim of lowering labour costs is negatively 





                                                 
10 Results not reported for saving space, but available under request; while all the firm characteristics 
listed  in  Table  A1  were  initially  included,  only  the  significant  regressors  were  retained  in  the  final 
estimated probit specification. 
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Table 2: Bivariate switching model: the selection equations 
  Funding  PDT_ONLY 
Funding  -  -1.496*** 
(0.000) 
PDT_ONLY  -1.389*** 
(0.000)  - 




logEmp1998^2  -0.013 
(0.308)  - 




Avgmkt  -0.025 
(0.498)  - 




Mkt_extent  -0.014 
(0.557)  - 
Gp  -0.042 
(0.551)  - 
Ext_gp  -0.179* 
(0.091)  - 




e_flexibility  -0.028 
(0.244)  - 
e_labour 
  -  -0.120*** 
(0.000) 
pro_formal  -  0.055 
(0.458) 
pro_strategic  -  -0.006 
(0.951) 
tot_inn intensity  -  -0.420 
(0.237) 
Growth_emp  -  -0.058 
(0.777) 
Hecon  -  -0.001 
(0.983) 
















Strategies  -  Included 
Industry dummies  included  Included 




N  2855 
Log-L  -2684.432 
Rho  0.9998*** (0.000) 
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Table 3: Bivariate switching model: the main equations 
 
Pdtv  E(pdtv|funding=1 & 
PDT_ONLY=1) 
E(pdtv|funding=0 &   
PDT_ONLY =1) 




























































Strategies  Included  Included 
Industry dummies  Included  Included 












N  389  357 
R-squared  0.2877  0.2866 
F test  F(50, 338) =  2.73***  F(50, 306) =  2.46*** 
Log-likelihood  -1447.5735  -1380.4640 
Notes: P-values in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%. 
 
 
Thirdly,  the  innovative  productivity  measure  was  separately  regressed  on  the 
sub-samples of firms identified by the switching variables, using the two inverse Mills 
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ratios  LAMBDA-A  and  LAMBDA-B  from  the  bivariate  probit  estimates.  However, 
given that our productivity measure is only available for the product-only innovators 
(see Section 3), only the first two classes (1, 1) and (0, 1) must be considered, comparing 
subsidized  and  non-subsidized  firms,  conditional  on  them  being  product  innovators. 
Results from this third step are reported in Table 3. 
As can be seen, an above-average expectation of the innovative impact on the 
quality of the products emerges as the major driver of innovative productivity
11. 
Fourthy,  turning  our  attention  to  the  main purpose  of  this  study,  the  average 
treatment effect of the subsidy (ATET) is computed in accordance with eq. 10. The 
results of this fourth step are reported in Table 4.  
 
 






[ ] 1 | , 1& _ 1 i i E pdtv x F PDT ONLY = =  
B 





N = 389  10.091  15.043  -4.953*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: p-values in brackets; *** = 1% significant. 
 
 
Far from being rejected, the efficiency loss highlighted by the preliminary descriptive 
statistics discussed in Section 3.2 (Table 1) above turns out to be even greater (and much 
more  significant),  once  firms’  characteristics  and  all  the  possible  sources  of  sample 
selection and endogeneity have been taken into account fully.  
Therefore, our suspicion of an efficiency loss being associated with government 
intervention is strongly confirmed: far from ‘doing better’ as a result of the subsidy, 
supported firms turn out to increase both their innovation inputs and their innovation 
outputs, but the latter effect is less than proportional with respect to the former.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Once  cleared of any source of firm heterogeneity due to different sources of 
sample  selection,  as  well  as being  checked  for possible  simultaneity between public 
support  and  the  qualitative  composition  of  a  firm’s  innovative  activity  (bivariate 
switching  model),  the  impact  of    an  innovation  subsidy  turns  out  to  be 
counterproductive.  
Despite  it  being  current  common  practice  to  publicly  support  innovation, 
government  intervention  actually  appears  to  just  induce  higher  expenses,  while  the 
efficiency associated with such innovative expenditures is affected negatively.  
                                                 
11 This is not surprising, since an innovation able to increase the quality of the final products significantly 
is likely to increase the share of turnover due to innovative products and hence our pdtv measure. 
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Table A1: List and definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
funding 
Dummy = 1 if the firm has received a financial subsidy in support of innovation, 
0 otherwise 
Pdtv  Innovative productivity (total innovative sales/total innovative expenditure) 
INNOVATIVE 
Dummy = 1 if the firm invested in innovative activities in the period 1998-2000 
and has realised a product and/or a  process innovation, or it has undertaken an 
innovative  project  (later  dropped  or  still  to  be  completed  at  December  31
st, 
2000) 
PDT_ONLY  Dummy = 1 if the firm has realised product innovations only 
Firm characteristics and other controls 
logEmp1998 (logEmp2000)  Logarithmic transformation of firm’s employees at December 31
st, 1998 (2000) 
Growth_emp  Employees - rate of growth (1998-2000) 
Exp_int  Export intensity (turnover from export/turnover) in 2000. 
mkt_extent  Prevailing (geographical) market extent, ranging from 0 (local) to 7 (Extra-UE) 
Gp  Belonging to an industrial group (dummy variable) 
ext_gp  Belonging to an industrial group with foreign headquarters (dummy variable) 
Industry dummies 
23  Industry  dummies  defined  according  to  the  two-digit  ATECO  91 
classification 
Pavitt1-Pavitt4 
Dummies mapping the three-digit ATECO 91 codes onto the four categories 
identified by Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy:  
pavitt1=1 for science-based firms, 0 otherwise; 
pavitt2=1 for supplier-dominated firms, 0 otherwise; 
pavitt3=1 for scale-intensive firms, 0 otherwise; 
pavitt4=1 for specialized suppliers, 0 otherwise 
lambda_inn  Inverse Mills ratio correcting for the selection of  innovative firms only 
Innovation-relevant information 
log(tot_exp)  Logarithmic transformation of total innovative expenditures in 2000 
tot_inn intensity 
Intensity  of  total  innovative  expenditures  in  2000  (total  innovative 
expenditure/turnover) 
Turninn  Sales due to new products 
Avgbasic 
Average  importance  of  basic  sources  of  information  (universities,  research 
institutes, conferences) for the innovative process: from 0 to 3 
Avgmkt 
Average importance of market sources of information (competitors, customers, 
suppliers) for the innovative process: from 0 to 3 
Cobasic 
Cooperation  agreements  with  universities  and/or  research  institutes  (dummy 
variable) 
e_market 
Innovation addressed to entering new markets or raising a firm’s market share: 
from 0 to 3 
e_capacity  Innovation addressed to raising production capacity: from 0 to 3 
e_flexibility  Innovation addressed to raising production flexibility: from 0 to 3 
e_labour  Innovation addressed to lowering the cost of labour: from 0 to 3 
Hinternal 
Average  relevance  of  internal  hurdles  (lack  of  information,  lack  of  skilled 
personnel, organizational rigidities) in hampering innovation (1998-2000): from 
0 to 3 
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Average relevance of financial hurdles (economic costs and/or risks too high, no 
sources of financial support) in hampering innovation (1998-2000): from 0 to 3 
pro_formal 
Dummy = 1 if patents, copyright or registration of brands are perceived by the 
firm as useful ways to increase appropriability 
pro_strategic 
Dummy = 1 if secrecy, complexity or lead time are perceived by the firm as 
useful ways to increase appropriability 
patent  Dummy = 1 if the firm registered at least one patent over the period 1998-2000 
pdt_quality  Evaluation of the innovative effect on product quality: from 0 to 3 
mkt_novelty  Dummy = 1 if product innovations are new to the market 
Otherinn 
Dummy  =  1  if  the  firm  realised  managerial,  strategic  and/or  organizational 
innovations (1998-2000) 
Strategies 
Sixteen innovative strategy dummies covering all the possible combinations of 
the four main innovative inputs firms can choose from: internal R&D; external 
R&D;  embodied  technological  acquisition  in  innovative  machinery; 





Arrow K. (1962) “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation” in The Rate and Direction of 
Economic Activity by R. Nelson, Ed., Princeton University Press: New York, 609-626. 
Bérubé C., Mohnen P. (2009) “Are Firms that Receive R&D Subsidies More Innovative?”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics 42, 206-225, 
Blundell R., Costa Dias M. (2000) “Evaluation Methods for Non-experimental Data”, Fiscal Studies 21, 427-468. 
Branstetter L., Sakakibara M. (1998) “Japanese Research Consortia: A Microeconometric Analysis of Industrial 
Policy”, Journal of Industrial Economics 46, 207-233. 
Busom I. (2000) “An Empirical Evaluation of the Effects of R&D Subsidies”, Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology 9, 111-148. 
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K. (2005) “Microeconometrics, Methods and Applications”, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
Capron H., Van Pottelsberghe B. (1997) “Public Support to Business R&D: a Survey and Some New Quantitative 
Evidence” in Policy Evaluation in Innovation and Technology. Towards Best Practices by OECD: Paris, 
35-47. 
Czarnitzki D. (2002) “Research and Development: Financial Constraints and the Role of Public Funding for 
Small And Medium-sized Enterprise” ZEW Discussion Paper Series N. 02-74, ZEW: Mannheim. 
García-Quevedo,  J.  (2004)  “Do  Public  Subsidies  Complement  Business  R&D?  A  Meta-analysis  of  the 
Econometric Evidence”, Kyklos 57, 87-102. 
Garcia A., Mohnen P. (2010) “Impact of government support on R&D and innovation” UNU-MERIT Working 
Paper 2010-034, UNU-MERIT: Maastricht. 
Gonzáles X., Jaumandreu J., Pazó C. (2005) “Barriers to Innovation and Subsidy Effectiveness”, RAND Journal 
of Economics 36, 930-949. 
Heckman J. (1979) “Sample Selection as a Specification Error”, Econometrica 47, 153-161. 
ISTAT (2004) “Statistiche sull' Innovazione delle Imprese, Settore Industria, Anni 1998-2000”, ISTAT: Roma. 
Lach S. (2002) “Do R&D Subsidies Stimulate or Displace Private R&D? Evidence from Israel”, Journal of 
Industrial Economics 50, 369-390. 
Lichtenberg,  F.  (1984)  “The  Relationship  between  Federal  Contract  R&D  and  Company  R&D”,  American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 74, 73-78. 
Pavitt K. (1984) “Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a Theory”, Research Policy 
13, 343-373. 
Rubin D. B. (1978) “Bayesian Inference for Causal Effects”, Annals of Statistics 6, 34-58. 
Wallsten S. J. (2000) “The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private R&D: The Case of the 
Small Business Innovation Research Program”, RAND Journal of Economics 31, 82-100.  
661